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PUNITIVE SURCHARGES AGAINST 
DISLOYAL FIDUCIARIES-IS ROTHKO 
RIGHT? 
Richard V. Wellman* 
Some principles for determining the liability of defaulting 
fiduciaries are woefully unclear.1 This lack of clarity breeds litiga-
tion and feeds the tendency of knowledgeable fiduciaries to ad-
minister estates with extreme caution. 
Recent litigation over the estate of artist Mark Rothko illus-
trates the uncertainty of rules for determining damages in cases 
of fiduciary breach. In In re Rothko,2 the New York courts found 
two of the three executors liable, on account of transactions 
tainted by conflict of interest, for sums greatly exceeding the 
normal ceilings of damages proximately caused by breach and 
restitution of amounts unjustly realized.3 Specifically, the courts 
held the executors responsible for post-sale appreciation of assets 
sold under power of sale, i.e., for the fair market value of the 
estate assets as of the date of the decree. 
This Article criticizes the award of a penalty surcharge in the 
* Alston Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1947, J.D. 
1949, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. The vagaries of fiduciary liability are discussed in Niles, A Contemporary View of 
Liability for Breach of Trust, 29 REC. AssN. B. Cm N.Y. 573 (1974); Niles & Schwartz, 
Breach of Trust-Recent Developments, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 165, 182-90 (1944); Note, 
Liability of Trustee in the Absence of Causal Relation Between Wrongdoing and Loss, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 317 (1936). Closely• related questions concerning standards and conse-
quences of breach of a fiduciary's duty of loyalty are discussed in Jones, Unjust Enrich-
ment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REV. 472 (1968). 
2. The most important opinion in the case, that of Surrogate Midonick, the trial 
judge, is reported in 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1975). The Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, modified and affirmed the decree, 56 App. Div. 2d 499,392 N.Y.S.2d 
870 (1977), and the Court of Appeals also affirmed. 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). For other accounts of the litigation and for comments, see L. SELDES, 
THE LEGACY OF MARK ROTHKO (1978); Carter, The Impact of the Rothko Case, ART NEWS 
Oct. 1977, at 78; Gardner, The Ordeal of Kate Rothkq: The War Isn't Over in Marlbo-
rough Country, New York, NEW YORK, Feb. 7, 1977, at 43; Merryman, The "Straw Man" 
in the Rothko Case, ART NEWS, Dec. i976, at 32; Challenging Rothko's "Straw Man", 
ART NEWS, March 1977, at 32 (letters to Merryman and his reply); Rosenberg, Death and 
the Artist, THE NEW YoRKER, March 24, 1975, at 69; Seldes, The Passion of Mark Rothko, 
ESQUIRE, Nov. 1974, at 118. 
3. The court held the disloyal fiduciaries and their collaborating transferee liable for 
the fair market value of the estate assets as of the time of trial. That value exceeded by 
more than two-and-three-quarter million dollars the amount the estate would have real-
ized from a lawful administration and the amount which the disloyal fiduciaries actually 
realized from their breach. See text at notes 16-21, and Part ill infra. 
95 
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name of appreciation damages. Contrary to the statements in the 
Rothko opinions, neither precedent nor treatises offers clear sup-
port for the shocking awards made against Rothko's disloyal exec-
utors. Furthermore, even if appreciation damages were to be 
viewed, against the thesis here advanced, as an appropriate rem-
edy for some kinds of fiduciary breach, the measure is inappro-
priate for cases which, like Rothko, involve hidden conflicts of 
interest. This is so because the threat of severe penalties in 
hidden-conflict cases adds unacceptable legal costs to honest 
administrations-costs that cannot be justified as a means of 
deterring undesirable conduct. Finally, Rothko illustrates how a 
court that surcharges a disloyal fiduciary for a sum exceeding 
amounts causally related to the breach or justified by the princi-
ple of restitution may unintentionally punish a merely negligent 
fiduciary. In sum, this Article urges that other courts repudiate 
Rothko: surcharges for disloyalty should not be governed by 
unique standards. 
I. THE GENERAL RULES 
The Restatement provides that a breaching fiduciary is lia-
ble for damages proximately caused by the breach.4 Thus, a bene-
ficiary will recover those values he would have enjoyed had there 
been no breach. Although some precedents appear to make de-
faulting fiduciaries insurers against reduced estate values or lost 
profits, 5 those precedents are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
proximate-causation rule. Liability for the full present value of a 
lost asset or opportunity is appropriate where a fiduciary, by 
selling an estate asset without authority, deprives the benefici-
aries of their interest in the asset. In that circumstance, the 
asset's value at the time of suit measures the damage proximately 
caused by the breach, unless the beneficiaries' interests in the 
asset would have ended even without the wrongful sale. 8 Some-
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) reads: 
Liability in Case of Breach of Trust 
If the the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with 
(a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach 
of trust; or 
(b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust; or 
(c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there had been 
no breach of tru·st. 
5. See Niles & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 182. 
6. For example, a trust instrument might direct that a particular security be retained 
and might preclude the holding of securities in certain other companies or industries. The 
trustee, though he sells without authority, surely should be relieved of liability for the 
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what similarly, if a fiduciary· invests estate funds in impermissi-
bly speculative assets, the standards for compensatory damages 
make him liable for a subsequent fall in the investment's market 
value even if the economic problems besetting the faltering enter-
prise afflicted other companies issuing less speculative securities. 
A defaulting fiduciary cannot escape liability because the securi-
ties of X company, a prudent investment he did not make, have, 
because of the stock market's vagaries or unanticipated scientific 
discoveries, depreciated as much as the securities he selected 
imprudently. If the fiduciary could use such evidence, the bene-
ficiaries could similarly demonstrate that the estate might be 
intact had the fiduciary invested in government bonds or made 
interest-bearing deposits in insured accounts. Still, it is generally 
inappropriate to hold the imprudent fiduciary liable for losses 
caused by a general business depression or by force or fraud for 
which· he was blameless.7 
The liability of a breaching fiduciary is not limited to dam-
ages proximately caused by the breach: irrespective of breach and 
any resulting loss, the Restatement provides that a fiduciary may 
not retain unauthorized gains realized from his administration of 
an estate. 8 Thus, if a fiduciary uses a power of sale to sell estate 
assets to himself at a fair market price, the beneficiaries may hold 
the fiduciary liable for any gain realized from a profitable resale.9 
If one disregards the usual standard of assessing proximately 
caused damages by reference to the values beneficiaries would 
have enjoyed had there been no breach, 10 this recovery of profits 
present value of the improperly sold security if a merger with a prohibited company would 
have made it impossible for the trustee to retain the original security. 
7. Cf. First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hosp., 288 Mass. 35, 45-46, 192 N.E. 
150, 152-53 (1934), where the court exonerated a trustee who, by failing to diversify, 
improperly retained stock, from the loss of the stock's market value because the court 
believed that the loss was less than the loss that would have occurred had the trustee 
diversified. See Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 1 N.J. 459, 64 A.2d 214 (1949), where 
the court ordered a surcharge in the full amount by which the market value of improperly 
retained securities fell during the Depression and ignored the effect of the Depression on 
permitted investments. 
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (1959), quoted in note 4 supra. Section 
203 reads: 
Accountability for Profits in the Absence of 
a Breach of Trust 
The trustee is accountable for any profit made by him through or arising out of the 
administration of the trust, although the profit does not result from a breach of 
trust. 
For a particularly useful discussion of this theory of recovery, see Niles, Trustee Accounta-
bility in the Absence of Breach of Trust, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 141 (1960). 
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206, Comment b (1959). 
10. The general rule has been stated in this way: 
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might be regarded as compensatory in the sense that the benefici-
aries could void the sale for self-dealing and claim all amounts 
realized by the fiduciary. Confusion with general standards of 
compensatory damages may be avoided, however, if the recovery 
is viewed more simply as the restitution of unauthorized personal 
gains. Restitution, which should never exceed what a defendant 
may have realized, deters disloyal fiduciary conduct efficiently, 
for it does not require the court to wrestle with the difficult issues 
of breach and causally related damages. 11 
Although breaching fiduciaries are normally liable only for 
damages proximately resulting from default unless the restitu-
tionary principle authorizes a larger recovery, it is not clear that 
these ceilings should apply in cases of willful misconduct. Specifi-
cally, it is uncertain whether the normal rules should apply where 
an executor, administrator, or trustee has allowed personal con-
flicts to compromise his efforts on behalf of an estate. 12 That 
uncertainty contributed to the startling result reached in the 
widely publicized litigation involving the estate of Mark Rothko. 
II. THE Rothko CASE 
Three months after Rothko's suicide in February 1970, three 
co-executors with the power of sale entered into two contracts 
with the Marlborough galleries13 covering all the artist's unsold 
works. One contract sold 100 paintings, selected by the gallery, 
for $1.8 million in annual interest-free installments over twelve 
years. The second contract consigned to the gallery the remaining 
698 paintings, to be sold over twelve years at a commission of fifty 
percent. 
The trial court, whose decision was affirmed by the appellate 
division and the court of appeals, 14 found that two of the execu-
tors, Reis and Stamos, had been influenced in approving the 
transactions by their personal ties with the gallery. It found that 
In all cases, then, of civil injury and of breach of contract the declared object of 
awarding damages is to give compensation for pecuniary loss; that is, to put the 
plaintiff in the same position, so far as money can do it, as he would have been if 
the contract had been performed or the tort not committed. 
1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 30, at 25 (9th ed. 1920). 
11. See Niles, supra note 8. However, Jones, supra note 1, who includes penalties in 
his discussion of restitutionary remedies, apparently would disagree. 
12. See text beginning at note 30 infra. 
13. The executors sold 180 paintings to Marlborough A.G., a Liechtenstein corpora-
tion, and consigned 658 paintings to Marlborough Gallery, Inc., a domestic corporation. 
For purposes of simplicity, both corporations will be referred to as the gallery. 
14. See note 2 supra. 
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the contracts were improvident: many details of the agreement 
appeared unusually favorable to the gallery which made substan-
tial profits on the resale of some of the paintings.15 Accordingly, 
the court voided the disposition, ordered the remaining 658 paint-
ings returned to the estate (140 works had been sold), and held 
all three executors as well as the gallery jointly and severally 
liable for $6,464,850.16 The court also held the two disloyal execu-
tors and the gallery liable for an additional $2,787,150 in 
"appreciation damages." Their total liability was thus 
$9,252,000. 
The sum of $6,464,850 represented the fair market value of 
the sold works at the time of their sale. 17 Of that sum, $5,476,500 
was the price the gallery had received for most of the 140 works 
it sold to bona fide purchasers in 1970, 1971, and 1972.18 The 
gallery had not actually received the remaining $988,350: 19 the 
court concluded that certain sales made hastily after the litiga-
tion began in November 1971 garnered less than fair market 
15. Surrogate Midonick's conclusion that the disloyalty of Reis and Stamos compro-
mised the estate's interests rested on several facts and circumstances summarized in 84 
Misc. 2d at 853-55, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
particularly emphasized the gallery's quick, profitable resales. 56 App. Div. 2d at 501, 392 
N.Y.S.2d at 872-73. 
16. Surrogate Midonick's recapitulation of the prices and values is reported as 
$6,464,880, 84 Misc. 2d at 833, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 975, but figures in his opinion indicate 
that the sum stated in the text is correct. 
17. This sum of $6,464,850 did not include interest from each sale date. The court, 
however, did assess this interest against executor Levine, thereby making his total liability 
higher than $6,464,850. Because the court assessed appreciation damages-the value of 
the 140 paintings at the time of the decree-against the two disloyal executors, the court 
did not similarly charge the disloyal executors with interest. See note 21 infra. Thus, the 
difference between Levine's liability of $6,464,850 plus interest and Reis's and Stamos's 
liability of $9,252,000 is less than the appreciation damages of $2,787,150. 
18. The court also provided that liability should be reduced by the amounts already 
paid to the estate by the gallery. It further provided that the gallery cpuld get credit, at 
the average values of $90,000 per canvas and $28,000 per paper, for any paintings it might 
be able to purchase and return to the estate. 84 Misc. 2d at 885, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 974-76. 
As modified by the Appellate Division, the order required the estate to accept any paint-
ings thus returned. 56 App. Div. 2d at 504, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 875. This portion of the order 
may have been inspired by the beneficiaries' claim that the gallery had "parked" valuable 
paintings in friendly hands to place them out of reach of any court. Apparently the trial 
court guessed correctly; one report indicates that, as of mid-1977, 43 paintings had been 
returned for credit. See Carter, supra note 2, at 78. This feature of the order might 
temporarily, at least, have prevented any significant drop in the market value of the 
paintings originally belonging to the estate. On the other hand, if the gallery's promotions 
increased the value of Rothko's work, the gallery stood to gain from downgrading the 
importance of some of his works to lower the amounts it might have to pay for paintings 
it could return for credit. 
19. This total appears in none of the reports. It represents the_ sum of what Surrogate 
Midonick referred to as "bulk dispositions." 84 Misc. 2d at 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 971. 
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value, and it held the gallery and all three executors liable for the 
difference between the fair market value of these paintings and 
the actual resale prices. The appreciation damages of $2,787,150 
levied against the two disloyal executors and the gallery repre-
sented the amount by which all the sold (and hence unrecover-
able) works had appreciated in value in the hands of the purchas-
ers and their transferees as of the date of the decree. The court 
declined to assess appreciation damages against the third execu-
tor, Levine, who had had no conflict of interest but who had 
negligently participated in a transaction with knowledge of his 
co-executors' conflicts. 20 
Had the award against the two disloyal executors and the 
gallery been only for the sums received by the gallery for sales and 
resales of the paintings ($5,476,500) plus interest from sale dates21 
it would have been justified by the principle of restitution. Since 
the gallery received this amount under arrangements contemplat-
ing personal benefits of uncertain amounts for the disloyal execu-
tors, a lower award might have unjustly enriched persons who 
collaborated to compromise estate interests. And since the gal-
lery's knowing collaboration in a breach of trust made it liable as 
a breaching fiduciary, 22 the award of $5,476,500 against it was also 
appropriate. 
It is harder to justify the award of $5,476,500 against Levine, 
the negligent but loyal co-executor, and of the additional $988,350 
against all three executors and the gallery. These awards are not 
restitutionary. Since Levine was not affiliated with the gallery, 
$5,476,500-the amount received by the gallery-simply cannot 
represent Levine's unauthorized gains. Similarly, the additional 
award of $988,350 was not even received by the gallery and could 
20. The court reasoned that appreciation damages are appropriately assessed against 
those guilty of disloyalty but not against the merely negligent. It also noted that "Levine's 
help as a candid witness, his verbal protests, and absence of self-interest or bad faith 
motives ... might well be the ground for relieving him of surcharge. But ..• [a]II we 
can find in his favor is a lower measure of damages . . . ." 84 Misc. 2d at 846, 379 
N.Y.S.2d at 942. 
21. It should be·noted that the court only assessed interest against executor Levine 
and not against the two disloyal executors. If the court had not assessed appreciation 
damages against the disloyal executors, it is quite likely that it would have charged them 
with interest from the sale dates. See note 17 supra. 
There is some support for including interest when the court awards compensatory 
damages against the fiduciary but none for including it when the court makes the fiduciary 
account for unjustly realized gains. See Marcus v. Otis, 169 F .2d 148, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1948). 
It would seem, however, that the restitutionary principle would permit an award of inter-
est approximating the value of the use of money to the fiduciary before he paid it over to 
the estate. 
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 291, Comments d, e, & f (1959). 
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not have been realized by Levine, the disloyal executors, or the 
_gallery. These awards could be justified as causally connected 
damages only if the estate beneficiaries were legally entitled to 
have the executors delay the disposition of the estate assets until 
the date of the gallery's sales. That is, if the executors had the 
duty to delay sales of the paintings, it might have been appropri-
ate to measure compensatory damages by the real value of the 
paintings when sold by th,e gallery. But the Rothko executors had 
a power of sale, and the courts should have considered how loyal 
and non-negligent executors would have handled the estate under 
the circumstances.23 Significantly, there was no finding that the 
timing of the estate contracts was wrongful. 
That failure particularly prejudiced executor Levine. In light 
of the trial court's refusal to assess appreciation damages against 
Levine 1:1nd the inapplicability of restitutionary liability, the 
court should have held Levine liable only for proximately caused 
damages. The court should have limited Levine's liability, with 
respect to the 100 paintings sold to the gallery in May 1970, to 
the difference between the adjusted contract price of $1.2 mil-
lion24 and the market value as of that date. If, as some evidence 
23. According to the trial court, the complainants' theory was that the executors sold 
too many paintings too soon for too little and consigned the balance in a way that surren-
dered control of the marketing of the estate's inventory to the gallery. The complainants' 
experts favored a more gradual plan of disposition that would have maximized the estate's 
share of the appreciation that typically follows the death of a highly regarded artist. 
However, if the court had estimated how loyal and non-negligent executors would have 
performed, it would have had to consider the problems confronting the Rothko executors 
in May 1970. For example, a loyal and non-negligent executor would have anticipated tax 
liabilities; weighed the risks of retaining inventory in the hope that, because of the stature 
of the artist and the quality of the paintings, its worth would increase; considered whether 
cash or art best suited the originally stated purpose of the residuary foundation to support 
deserving artists pending market acceptance of their works; and remembered the conven-
tional wisdom of fiduciary administration that the fiduciary's first obligation is to con-
serve values which are certain and to avoid speculation. These considerations might well 
have led the court to conclude that the artist's cash position at death-$330,000 in bank 
deposits and $1.1 million in receivables largely owed by the defendant gallery (according 
to Seldes, supra note 2, at 178)-was probably inadequate to meet both the substantial 
estate taxes and the $250,000 bequest to Mrs. Rothko and that the executors were justified 
in selling when they did in order to establish tax values and to meet these liabilities. 
Indeed, the original estate tax return of the executors conceded liability of $546,000; the 
IRS responded with a deficiency assessment of $4,611,500. ART NEWS, March 1977, at 32 
(letter from Franklin Feldman). Furthermore, some have questioned whether a substan-
tial portion of the estate's inventory of paintings was actually of high quality. See id. at 
32 (letter from John Bernard Myers). 
24. Although the contract price was $1.8 million, the court noted that the contract 
provided for installment payments without interest, and it discounted the average price 
per painting from $18,000 to $12,000. According to the court, then, the contract price was 
actually $1.2 million. 84 Misc. 2d at 850, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 946. 
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showed, the value of the paintings increased by one-third between 
May 1970 and January 1972,25 the failure of the trial court to 
assess only those damages caused by breach increased Levine's 
liability by about $4.8 million.28 Thus, the case illustrates that the 
failure to consider causal connection in fiduciary surcharge situa-
tions where the restitutionary principle is inapplicable may result 
in unintended penalties for those merely negligent. 
The courts' treatment of the appreciation-damages issue is 
equally egregious and will be addressed in the remainder of this 
Article. 
ill. APPRECIATION DAMAGES 
As noted above, all three courts held the two disloyal fidu-
ciaries and the gallery liable for $2,787,150 in appreciation dam-
ages, thereby bringing their total liability to $9,252,00Q. The ap-
preciation damages were neither proximately caused by the 
breach nor realized by the disloyal fiduciaries or by the gallery. 
The critical question is whether amounts exceeding both restitu-
tion and causally connected damages should be awarded against 
a disloyal fiduciary. The three opinions rely on several arguments 
for the surcharge, all of them unsatisfactory. · 
A. The Reasoning Behind the Rothko Rulings 
The opinions state that appreciation damages compensate 
for values the estate would have enjoyed but for the executors' 
wrongful conduct. Judge Cooke of the court of appeals wrote: 
"[S]ince the paintings cannot be returned, the estate is therefore 
entitled to their value at the time of the decree, i.e., appreciation 
damages. These are not punitive damages in a true sense, rather 
they are damages intended to make the estate whole."27 Surrogate 
Midonick's comment is more revealing: 
25. The trial court received this evidence, but made no finding. 
26. The trial court indicated that of the 140 paintings sold, 71 were from the group 
of 100 purchased by the gallery and the remaining 69 were from the consigned paintings. 
Arguably, Levine should have been entirely exonerated from damages relating to the sales 
from the consigned art, since all of these sales appear to have been made at prices well in 
excess of market values as of May 1970. The possibly excessive 50% commission for the 
gallery would be moot once the gallery accounted for all the sales proceeds. At most, 
Levine's negligence in approving the overly generous commission should have made him 
a guarantor against the loss arising from the commission. Under this reasoning, Levine's 
maximum liability should have been about $1.6 million plus interest, rather than $6.4 
million plus interest. The lower figure is the difference between the adjusted contract price 
of $12,000 per painting and an average value of $34,740 (market price in 1972, less one-
third) for 71 paintings sold. 
27. 43 N.Y.2d at 332, 372 N.E.2d at 298,401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
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The question of allowing "lost profits" or "appreciation dam-
ages" to beneficiaries of a trust or estate for a breach of fiduciary 
duty is a difficult one where the fiduciaries have a power of sale. 
If in the area of trusts and estates the sole purpose of damages is 
to make the beneficiary whole, it would seem that when a fiduciary 
is authorized to sell and he sells to himself or to another with whom 
he is closely associated, the actual injury to the beneficiary is the 
difference, if any, between the price paid and the price which could 
have been obtained on the market. On the other hand is the rule 
that the fiduciary may be directed to reconvey the property at the 
option of the beneficiary if it remains in his possession and it may 
be argued that "[a]ppreciation damages represent the monetary 
equivalent of reconveyance."28 
Surrogate Midonick, in other words, argued that apprecia-
tion damages are compensatory because the fiduciary had the 
duty to return the assets in kind. His analysis, however, misses 
the point. First, estate beneficiaries have the right to restitution 
in kind only if the breaching fiduciary retains the asset. If the 
gallery ( which was treated as a breaching fiduciary because of its 
collaboration in the breach) could keep the paintings by showing 
that the legal expectations of estate beneficiaries were limited to 
the fair market value of the paintings when sold by the executors, 
the gallery would be .unjustly enriched. But once the gallery sells 
the paintings to bona fide purchasers, the restitutionary principle 
requires only that the gallery's liability be measured by the pro-
ceeds of the sales. Second, once the asset has been sold, apprecia-
tion damages are compensatory only if the fiduciary had the duty 
to retain the assets until the date of the decree. The Rothko 
executors, however, had no such duty. Moreover, if the Rothko 
court thought appreciation damages were compensatory, why did 
it not assess appreciation damages against executor Levine, 
whose negligence exposed him to claims for compensatory 
damages? Plainly, the award of appreciation damages is a slightly 
disguised penalty. If warranted at all, the penalty should be as-
sessed openly, not in the guise of compensatory damages. 
Perhaps anticipating this objection, the three opinions cite 
precedent and treatises in support of the penalty surcharges. 
Those authorities, however, are either unpersuasive or irrelevant. 
The trial court asserted that appreciation damages are ap-
propriate when the breaching fiduciary is guilty of bad faith, 
disloyalty, or self-dealing, and it cited the Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts (1959) as support.29 The Restatement, however, is equiv-
28. 84 Misc. 2d at 876, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69. 
29. 84 Misc. 2d at 876-77, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 969. 
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ocal on appreciation damages.30 On one hand, it rejects those 
precedents that treat all fiduciary transactions in breach of trust 
as void and thus make breaching trustees liable routinely for non-
causally connected losses. Specifically, section 206 applies the 
general rules of section 20531 to a disloyal trustee. 32 Section 205 
limits the liability of a breaching trustee to any loss resulting 
from the breach of trust, or to any profit which would have ac-
crued to the trust estate if there had been no breach.33 Although 
that rule would suggest that a disloyal fiduciary is not liable for 
appreciation damages, neither section 205 nor section 206 directly 
addresses the liability of a disloyal trustee who buys estate assets 
and then resells. 34 
On the other hand, section 205, comment f, of the 
Restatement also asserts that punitive damages are appropriately 
assessed when the fiduciary is guilty of conversion or some con-
flict of interest such as self-dealing. 35 As a law review note stated: 
30. Referring to the Restatement of Trusts (1935), the author of a 1958 law review 
note about appreciation damage against trustees who exercise a power of sale by selling 
trust assets to themselves noted: "Treatise authority for the imposition of appreciation 
damages can be found in Scott and the Restatement. Neither authority, however, is free 
from equivocation; in the Restatement, in fact, the equivocation is so strong that it might 
be cited as contrary authority." Note, Appreciation Damages for Self-Purchase by Trustee 
with Power of Sale, 25 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 389, a89 n.3 (1958). This Article argues that 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) is similarly equivocal. 
31. See note 4 supra. 
32. REs'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 (1959) reads: 
Liability for Breach of Duty of Loyalty 
The rule stated in § 205 is applicable where the trustee in breach of trust sells 
trust property to himself individually, or sells his individual property to himself as 
trustee, or otherwise violates his duty of loyalty. 
33. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (1959), supra note 4, also provides that 
a breaching trustee is liable for the restitution of any unjustly realized profits. See text at 
note 8 supra. 
34. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 (1959), supra note 32, is primarily di-
rected at a trustee who either buys estate assets or sells his own property to the estate, 
35. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205, Comment f (1959), states: 
Loss Not Resulting from Breach of Trust. As is stated in Clause (a), a trustee is 
liable for a loss resulting from a breach of trust. A question may arise, therefore, as 
to the causal connection between the breach of trust and the loss. If the trustee 
commits a breach of trust and if a loss is incurred, the trustee may not be charge-
able with the amount of the loss if it would have occurred in the absence of a 
breach of trust. 
Where a trustee has committed a breach of trust in failing to earmark a trust 
investment, he is not necessarily liable for a loss resulting from the making of the 
investment. See § 179, Comment d. He is not liable where the loss did not result 
from the failure to earmark, except in a situation where as a matter of policy an 
absolute liability is imposed upon the trustee in order to deter him from committing 
such a breach of trust. The trustee is liable for the loss where he has taken securities 
in his own name in order that he may subsequently be in a position where he may 
claim the securities as his own if they go up in value and claim that they are held 
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[Trustee liability for losses not caused by breach] finds a parallel 
only in the harshest elements of the technical law of conversion. 
Where the trustee has acted in bad faith, the necessity of uphold-
ing the fiduciary character of the relation may require the imposi-
tion of a liability which is mainly punitive. 38 
Arguably, then, the Restatement suggests that appreciation 
damages may be assessed against disloyal executors. This argu-
ment, however, is flawed. First, the Restatement mistakenly 
treats all instances of self-dealing as conversion.37 Unlike conver-
sion, self-dealing need not involve bad faith and may even benefit 
the estate. The Restatement correctly holds liable for any loss 
resulting from the investment, a trustee who fails to earmark 
trust assets and willfully arranges both his own and the trust 
assets so that those that depreciate could be shuffled over to the 
trust beneficiaries. 38 Since the fiduciary has, in effect, stolen the 
estate's assets, the penalty is appropriate. Contrary to the 
Restatement, however, it is inappropriate to make similarly lia-
ble as an insurer against future loss of market value a trustee who 
purchases for the trust property owned by him individually. 38 If 
by him as trustee if they go down in value. He is liable for the loss even though he 
had no such purpose in mind, as long as his failure to earmark puts him in a position 
where it would be easy for him to make similar claims. On the other hand, if there 
is no danger that such claims could successfully be made, the breach of trust 
involved in the merely technical failure to earmark the investment does not render 
the trustee liable for _a loss resulting from the investment. 
If a breach of trust consists only in investing too large an amount in a single 
security or type of security, the trustee is liable only for such loss as results from 
the investment of the excess beyond the amount which it would have been proper 
so to invest. See § 228, Comment h. 
If a trustee lends on mortgage more than the proper proportion of the value of 
the property, but the loan is otherwise proper, the trustee is liable only for the loss 
of the excess. See § 229, Comment b. 
On the other hand, where the trustee purchases for the trust, property owned 
by him individually, and the property depreciates in value, it is immaterial that 
the trustee could properly have purchased similar property from a third person and 
that in such a case he would not have been liable for the loss. In order to deter self-
dealing by the trustee, he is chargeable with any loss which results. See § 206, 
Commentd. 
As to the liability of the trustee where he has failed to comply with the terms 
of the trust and has incurred a loss, but a loss would have occurred even though he 
had complied with the terms of the trust, see § 212. 
As to the question of the liability for a loss where there is a subsequent gain, 
see§ 213. 
See Miller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943). 
36. Note, supra note·1, at 317. 
37. The treatises make the same mistake. See G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 543, at 217 (2d rev. ed. 1978); 2 A. SCO'IT, LAw OF TRUSTS§ 170.2 (3d ed. 1967). 
38. REBTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 205, Comment f (1959), supra note 35. 
39. See the fifth paragraph of REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 205, Comment f 
(1959), supra note 35. 
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the asset is suitable for trust investment, the price is fair, and the 
trustee is without hidden personal purpose, this kind of self-
dealing is readily distinguishable from deliberate stealing and 
does not clearly warrant penalty damages. 
Second, even if the Restatement is correct that some trustee 
conduct, including innocent or malevolent self-dealing, should be 
singled out for punitive treatment, appreciation damages are par-
ticularly harsli and are not supported even by the Restatement. 
Suppose a trustee sells an estate asset to himself and then resells 
it. Also, he purchases another asset for the trust from himseif. 
The hypothesis is that the trustee can be penalized40 for the sub-
sequent appreciation of the asset sold and for the actual loss in 
value of the acquired trust asset. But, liability as an insurer 
against loss of the wrongfully acquired asset is significantly less 
harsh than liability for the value of the asset sold if it appreciates 
after it leaves the trustee's control. There is an obvious difference 
between making a trustee liable for more than he could have 
realized at any time when the asset was in his hands, and mak-
ing a trustee liable for the fair market value of the assets when 
acquired or when sold. Moreover, the trustee as an involuntary 
insurer against loss of the wrongfully acquired asset can limit 
his liability by selling the asset for the benefit of the trust. This 
option, of course, is unavailable to a trustee who wrongfully sold 
to himself, resold, and accounted to the trust for full value re-
ceived and who remains liable for subsequent appreciation. 
In contrast to the Restatement, section 206 of Professor 
Scott's treatise states that appreciation damages may be assessed 
when a trustee (presumably with a power of sale) sells trust prop-
erty to himself and subsequently resells to another. 41 That brief 
assertion, however, is unpersuasive: the treatise cited no cases 
40. The trustee's liability for the loss in value is here deemed a "penalty" only 
when the liability exceeds that causally related to the breach and restitution of any 
benefits realized by the trustee. Thus, when the trust might properly have acquired the 
asset and the trustee did not expect to incur the loss, liability for the loss in value is not 
causally related to the breach and constitutes a true penalty. In contrast, if the trust 
should not have acquired the asset because, say, the assets were impermissibly specula-
tive, the trustee's liability for the asset's loss in value would normally be deemed causally 
related to the breach and would not constitute a penalty. See text at notes 5, 6, & 7 supra. 
41. Rothko, of course, is now cited by Scott as support for the assessment of apprecia-
tion damages. 3 A. Soorr, supra note 37, § 206, at 19-20 (Supp. 1978). Id. at 1675-76 (3d 
ed. 1967) states: 
If the trustee sells P!Operty to himself individually, and subsequently resells the 
property to a third person, the beneficiaries have the option of charging him with 
the value of the property at the time of sale with interest, or with the value of the 
property at the time of the suit, or they can hold him accountable for the proceeds. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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and did not discuss the differences suggested above between 
liability for controllable loss and liability for subsequent appre-
ciation. 
During their discussions of appreciation damages, both Sur-
rogate Midonick and the court of appeals cited section 208(b) of 
the Restatement. That section, however, provides that a trustee 
who breaches by selling assets he should have retained is liable 
for the value of the assets at the date of the decree.42 Since the 
executors in Rothko were clearly under no duty to retain the 
paintings, this section is simply inapplicable to them. 
Surrogate Midonick43 and the court of appeals44 also read 
Restatement section 291, and the companion discussion in Pro-
fessor Scott's treatise, as supporting the award of appreciation 
damages. Comment g of section 291 states that a transferee who 
receives property from a breaching trustee and who knows of that 
breach is liable for the value of the property at the time of the 
decree.45 Thus, the section deals with the liability, not of a trus-
tee, but of a transferee. Since it is unreasonable to impose a 
heavier liability on a transferee than on the defaulting trustee, 
the section only applies when the trustee is liable for appreciation 
damages. As noted above, a trustee is usually so liable only if he 
42. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 208 (1959) reads: 
Liability for Breach of Trust by Selling 
Trust Property 
(1) If the trustee sells trust property which it is his duty to retain, the beneficiary 
can 
(a) charge him with its value at the time of such sale, with interest thereon; or 
(b) charge him with its value at the time of the decree, with the income which 
would have accrued thereon if he had not sold it, or require him to make specific 
reparation if this is reasonable under the circumstances; or 
(c) require him to account for the proceeds of the sale. 
(2) If the trustee sells trust property which it is his duty to retain, the beneficiary 
can enforce an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the sale as security for his claim 
under the rules stated in Clauses (a) and (b). . 
43. 84 Misc. 2d at 835, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 967-68. 
44. 43 N.Y.2dat321-22, 372 N.E.2dat297-98; 401 N.Y.S.2dat456 (citing4A. ScO'IT, 
supra note 37, § 291.2. 
45. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 291, Comment g (1959), states: 
§ 291 Extent of Liability of Transferee with Notice 
Comment g 
If the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust property to a person who takes 
with notice of the breach of trust and the transferee has disposed of the property, 
he is liable for its value {it the time of the decree with the income earned by the 
property from the time when it was acquired by the transferee until the time of the 
decree. Since the transferee has disposed of the property and cannot restore it to 
the trust, he can be compelled to pay to the trust the equivalent in money of what 
would have been in the trust if no breach of trust had been committed and the 
property had been retained in the trust. • . • 
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must retain the asset. 45 Thus interpreted, section 291 does not 
support the assessment of appreciation damages against the dis-
loyal executors; it would, however, support the assessment 
against the gallery if the executors were otherwise liable. 
Finally, the court of appeals offered an unusual interpreta-
tion of Restatement section 205, comment d, and the related 
discussion in Scott's treatise.47 Both Scott48 and the Restatement49 
note that liability for subsequent appreciation is normally proper 
only where a trustee has sold assets he was under a duty to retain. 
Both further observe that if the breach consists only50 in selling 
the asset for too little, the trustee's liability is limited to the 
difference between its fair market value and the price received. 
The court of appeals interpreted the use of the word "only" to 
mean that appreciation damages are appropriate where the 
breach consisted of a misfeasance in addition to a sale for too 
little. That is, the court reasoned that appreciation damages 
should be assessed "where the breach of trust consists of a serious 
conflict of interest-which is more than merely selling for too 
little."51 Neither Scott nor the Restatement, however, supports 
such an interpretation. The Restatement does not discuss the 
point and Scott cites, as minority authority, only three English 
cases, none of which involve conversion or disloyalty by the trus-
tees. In one of the cases, the court concluded that the trustee 
lacked a power to sell under th.e circumstances;52 in the others, a 
proper sale was found to be linked with an unpermitted invest-
ment of the proceeds and was treated as an unpermitted sale.53 
Since the latter two cases suggest that a trustee becomes an in-
surer whenever he breaches his trust-a liability harsher than 
46. For example, under a casual reading of Restatement § 291, Comment g, a trans-
feree with knowledge of breach by a trustee would be subject to greater liability than a 
trustee whose breach consisted of, say, selling a trust asset for too little. Section 205, 
Comment d indicates that such a trustee's liability is not for appreciation damages but 
for the difference between the fair market value of what the trustee actually received and 
the amount he should have received. Yet, read without qualification, § 291, Comment g 
suggests that the transferee with whom the trustee dealt in that situation may be liable 
for appreciation damages; that is, for the value of the property at the time of suit. 
47. 43 N.Y.2d at 321,372 N.E.2d at 297, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
48. 3 A. SC01T, supra note 37, § 208.3. 
49. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TRUSTS§ 208, Comment d (1959). 
50. 3 A. SC01T, supra note 37, § 208.3 used "merely" instead of "only." 
51. 43 N.Y.2d at 321, 372 N.E.2d at 297, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
52. "The result is that the trustees ought not to have sold these bonds; they sold them 
without excuse, and must make the amount [present value) good so that the plaintiffs 
are absolutely protected." Re Walker, 62 L.T.R. (n.s.) 449, 452 (1890). 
53. Re Massingberd's Settlement, 63 L.T.R. (n.s.) 296 (1890), affg, 60 L.T.R. (n,s.) 
620 (1889); Phillipson v. Gatty, 7 Hare 516, 68 Eng. Rep. 213 (1848). 
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even Restatement section 205 contemplates-they are unpersua-
sive. 
In sum, neither of these texts persuasively sµpports the as-
sessment of appreciation damages. The Restatement approves 
those precedents which make disloyal fiduciaries insurers against 
loss, but is silent on appreciation damages. Although Scott as-
serts that disloyal fiduciaries are liable for appreciation damages, 
his statement is unsupported. 
The case authority relied on by the Rothko opinions is even 
less compelling then either Scott or the Restatement. Although 
most of the cited cases are readily distinguishable from Rothko, M 
54. Surrogate Midonick cited In re Talbot's Estate, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 
848 (1956), where the court rejected a claim that a trustee who in good faith but wrongfully 
disposed of assets was liable for damages measured by the value of the asset at the time 
of suit. The opinion, however, noted that California statutory law appeared to sanction 
damages measured by the value of the property at the time of trial where the trustee 
operated in bad faith and· that it limited to compensation damages for wrongful disposi-
tion in good faith. In dictum, it also suggested that the Restatement similarly supports a 
penalty recovery where the trustee operated in bad faith. At best, this authority simply 
restates California statutory law. 
A second case Surrogate Midonick cited, Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62, 116 (N .Y. 
1816), involved executors who misappropriated proceeds of estate assets that were sold 
pursuant to a wrongfully obtained probate court order. Since the estate beneficiaries had 
a legal right to the assets in kind, the award of damages based on the value of the estate 
assets at the time of trial was clearly compensatory, and the precedent is not on point. 
The court also cited a United States Supreme Court case, Buffam v. Peter Barceloux 
Co., 289 U.S. 227 (1933), in support of its decision. In that case, stock in a family corpora-
tion had been fraudulently transferred and had come to rest in the hands of defendants. 
The district court awarded as damages for conversion the highest value attained by the 
stock up to the time of the decree. 51 F.2d 80 (N .D. Cal. 1929). The California statute on 
which the award was based was amended shortly thereafter to limit damages from conver-
sion to compensation. The question in the Supreme Court was whether the defendants 
could return the stock in kind; that option was desirable because the value of the stock 
was then considerably below the district court's award. The Court held that the plaintiffs 
had the choice of remedies. This precedent, then, simply fails to address the issue of 
appreciation damages. 
McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 8 N.E. 152 (1886), which Surrogate Midonick 
cited without description or explantation, involved a trustee who sold trust assets for the 
purpose of misappropriating the proceeds and who continued to represent to the benefici-
aries that the trust estate was still intact. The court held his sureties liable for the value 
of the assets as of the date of the trial. The court, noting the lack of evidence concerning 
the amount realized by the trustee from his misappropriation, treated the case as one 
where no power of sale existed. McKim is distinguishable from Rothko both in the degree 
of chicanery practiced by the fiduciary and in the propriety of the award as a means of 
avoiding unjust enrichment by an unknown amount. For all the court in McKim knew, 
the defaulting trustee had wrongfully realized amounts as large as the value of the former 
trust estate at the time of trial. The same plainly cannot be said of the Rothko defendants. 
Finally, the Surrogate referred to a Texas precedent, McCord v. Nabours, 101 Tex. 
494, 109 S.W. 913 (1908). That case is on point, but the court's reasoning in it is unper-
suasive, for it merely relies on precedents in which the trustee lacked the power of sale. 
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some warrant specific mention. First, both the court of appeals55 
and the appellate division58 cited Menzel v. List51 for its assess-
ment of appreciation damages. In that warranty of title action, 
the court held the seller of a stolen asset liable to the buyer, from 
whom the owner replevied the asset, for the value of the painting 
at the time of the decree rather than for the purchase price. The 
Menzel court reasoned that, absent the seller's breach of war-
ranty, the buyer would have been entitled to the assets and that 
appreciation damages made the buyer whole. The New York 
Court of Appeals concluded that appreciation damages were 
similarly appropriate in Rothko since the Rothko plaintiffs would 
also have been entitled to the paintings if the defendants had not 
sold them.58 What the court of appeals overlooked is that the 
Rothko beneficiaries-unlike a purchaser, who is legally pro-
tected from a title defect-had no legally protected expectation 
that the asset would.remain subject to their interests.50 The ma-
jority mistakenly considered the appreciation damages compen-
satory, but the Rothko beneficiaries were entitled to restitution 
of amounts unjustly realized, not to the monetary equivalent of 
reconveyance. 
Second, the trial court relied extensively on Hopkins v. 
Loeber. 80 In that case, one of the three trustees who sold trust 
assets subsequently acquired those assets, as he had intended 
when he authorized the sale. Although the Illinois court limited 
the liability of the two loyal trustees to the value of the asset at 
the time of the disposition, it measured damages against the 
disloyal fiduciary as of the time the assets were later foreclosed. 
The reported opinion,91 however, gives no clue as to whether the 
disloyal trustee continued to hold the assets until the foreclosure. 
It emphasized that the disloya~ trustee, unlike the other trustees, 
personally benefitted in an uncertain amount by the transaction, 
and it held that the sum paid at the foreclosure sale was evidence 
of the amount of the illegal gain. Since Hopkins may involve 
nothing more than restitution, it is insignificant for our inquiry. 
Further, whereas the Rothko trial court made specific findings of 
55. 43 N.Y.2d at 322, 372 N.E.2d at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
56. 56 App. Div. 2d at 502, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 873. 
57. 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969). 
58. 43 N.Y.2d at 322, 372 N.E.2d at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. 
59. In the appellate division, Justice Nunez vainly argued this point. 66 App. Div. 
2d at 508, 392 N.Y.S.2d·at 877 (dissenting opinion). 
60. 332 Ill. App. 140, 74 N.E.2d 39 (1947). 
61. Although the. reported opinion incorporates the facts and findings of an earlier 
decision in the case, only an abstract of the earlier decision was printed. See Hopkins v, 
Loeber, 323 Ill. App. 652, 56 N.E.2d 490 (1944). 
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the amounts received by the gallery, Hopkins, as precedent for a 
penalty award, is applicable only where the amount of conceded 
unjust enrichment cannot be measured. 
Finally, Surrogate Midonick cited the New York conversion-
of-stock cases. 62 While under the current rule damages for conver-
sion are measured by the market value of the stock as of a reason-
able time after notice of the conversion, 63 the old rule held the 
converter liable for the stock's highest value between the date of 
conversion and the date of trial. 64 Although the courts rejected the 
~ld punitive rule because it leads to vindictive awards, 65 Surro-
62. 84 Misc. 2d at 878, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71. 
63. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 22 N.Y.2d 672, 291 N.Y.S.2d 
366, 238 N.E.2d 754 (1968); cf. German v. Snedeker, 257 App. Div. 596, 13 N.Y.S.2d 237, 
affd., 281 N.Y. 832, 24 N.E.2d 492 (1939), where the court held that the appropriate 
measure of damages was the market value of the stock at the time of the conversion or 
the market value of the stock within a reasonable time after notice of conversion, which-
ever was higher. 
64. See Annot., Measure of Damages for Conversion of Corporate Stock or Certifi-
cate, 31 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1970), and cases cited at id. 1324 n.12. 
65. In Suydam v. Jackson, 5 Sup. Ct. (3 Sand.) 614, 629 (N.Y. 1850), the court 
considered whether the measure of damage in conversion cases should be the highest value 
the goods attained between the date of the conversion and the entry of judgment. 'rhe 
opinion exhaustively analyzed English and American cases and observed: 
Our objections to considering an intermediate higher value as an invariable 
rule of damages, have already been stated, and need not be repeated. It is perfectly 
just, when the enhanced price has been realized by the wrongdoer, or it is reason-
able to believe would have been realized by the owner, had he retained the posses-
sion; but, in all other cases, damages founded upon such an estimate, are either 
purely speculative, or plainly vindictive. They are conjectural and speculative, 
when it is barely possible that the owner, had he retained the possession, would 
have derived a benefit from the higher value. They are vindictive, when it is certain 
that no such benefit could have resulted to him. It is however proper, and perhaps 
necessary, to examine the cases that have been cited and relied on, since the 
construction which has been given them by the defendant's counsel is by no means 
novel, nor unsupported by authority. It will appear, we think, that the true import 
of the English decisiqns has been greatly misunderstood, and that they by no means 
justify the conclusions which have been drawn from them. 
Subsequently, the court of appeals, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 224 (1873), 
overruled Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235 (1869), which followed earlier precedents 
establishing the highest value to the day-of-trial rule for determining damages in stock 
conversion cases. The Baker opinion noted: 
The most thorough consideration of the subject to be found in any reported 
case is contained in the extremely able opinion of Duer, J., in Suydam v. Jenkins 
. • . where that accomplished jurist reviews, with great discrimination, many of the 
cases here referred to, and others which have not been cited, and arrives substan-
tially at the same conclusion as that reached by Church, Ch. J., in Matthews v. 
Coe . . . that the highest price which the property has borne at any time between 
its conversion and the trial cannot in all cases be the just measure of damages. The 
reasoning contained in that opinion is of such force as to outweigh the apparent 
preponderance of authority in favor of the rule claimed, and demonstrates its fal-
lacy when applied to the facts of the present case, whether the cause of action be 
deemed for conversion of property or the breach of a contract. 
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gate Midonick argued that it should be used in disloyal fiduciary 
cases. He first conceded that a victim's ability to purchase other 
stocks and minimize his damages made the old rule harsh: it is 
unjust to "reward" those victims who fail to cover by awarding 
larger damages if the assets appreciate. He then reasoned that 
because a trust beneficiary is unlikely to learn of his trustee's 
breach and thus may be unable to cover purchases, the old rule 
would not harshly treat a disloyal fiduciary. 
This reasoning is questionable. In effect, it uses precedents 
which New York had rejected because of their severity to justify 
imposing an extremely harsh liability on disloyal fiduciaries-a 
liability exceeding any benefit wrongfully obtained or any value 
the beneficiaries reasonably expected. 
Moreover, it is clearly more justifiable to impose the old 
punitive rule on a converter than on a disloyal fiduciary. In con-
trast to a disloyal executor who partially benefits from his other-
wise beneficial administration of an estate, a converter does noth-
ing for his victim, who is deprived of possession and left with the 
remedy of damages or replevin. Damages equal to the present 
value of the chattel are compensatory as against one who refuses 
to yield. possession on demand, and may be no more than com-
pensatory when awarded against the original converter for the 
chattel's value as of a time soon after the conversion. A trust 
beneficiary without an enforceable expectation that a trustee will 
retain a particular asset has no legitimate claim to more than the 
value of the trustee's proper performance. Surrogate Midonick's 
reasoning should be rejected. 
B. Policy Arguments Against Appreciation Damages 
Although the authority the courts cited did not compel the 
assessment of appreciation damages in Rothko, one might still 
argue that the heavy penalty was justifiable, that the disloyal 
fiduciaries deserved all they got. Moreover, as the Rothko opin-
ions say, the penalty deters disloyalty. 
Penalty surcharges may be appropriate when they discourage 
undesired acts without creating factual or legal uncertainties that 
increase the cost of trust administration and invite complex liti-
gation. Penalties, in other words, should attach only for violations 
of rules that are easily identified, understood and followed. The 
rules requiring fiduciaries to earmark trust property, to avoid 
commingling trust and personal assets, and to avoid self-dealing 
transfers of assets between themselves and trust estates are ex-
amples of such rules. Penalizing violations of them by making 
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fiduciaries insurers deters potentially harmful conduct by calling 
attention to obvious acts that should not occur unless specifically 
sanctioned by the trust instrument. Violations of such rules are 
readily avoided by fiduciaries and trust draftsmen. It does not 
follow, of course, that the penalties for these violations should be, 
as appreciation damages are, potentially unlimited and beyond 
the control of the errant fiduciary. A trustee who discovers that 
he has erred should be able to cure his error or to limit the conse-
quences. Thus, a trustee who buys from or sells to himself should 
be able, by liquidating the assets, to protect the trust from depre-
ciation and to limit his own liability as an insurer. If he cannot, 
expensive litigation is almost certain to follow, especially where 
the value of the assets has appreciated significantly. 
Moreover, the wisdom of assessing any penalty can be ques-
tioned when a trustee has, or later may be said to have had, 
personal interests which conflict with his fiduciary duty. In such 
instances, it will usually be unclear whether the fiduciary has 
breached his duty of loyalty: liability is decided by hindsight and 
may arise in countless unforeseen ways. A penalty exceeding the 
liability of an insurer against controllable losses is simply an 
unjust remedy for conduct of only uncertain impropriety. Even 
in Rothko, the wrongfulness of the exceutors' conduct was not 
self-evident. For example, in 1969 Rothko sold a number of paint-
ings to the gallery at prices comparable to those of the executors' 
1970 sale and signed a long-term exclusive-consignment contract 
with the gallery.66 Further, Rothko knew that Reis and Stamos 
had personal ties to the gallery. These facts suggest that Rothko 
wanted his executors to deal with the gallery. Nor was it clear 
that executor Reis profited financially from his connection with 
the gallery: the surrogate found that his prestige was enhanced. 67 
66. None of the prevailing opinions mentioned the 1969 sale. J~stice Nunez's dissent-
ing opinion in the appellate division described a 1969 sale by Rothko to the gallery of 87 
paintings for $1,050,000. 56 App. Div. 2d at 508, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 877. Rosenberg, supra 
note 2, at 71, asserted: "In contrast to his earlier clenched hold on his paintings, Rothko 
seems to have manifested, in 1969, the year before his death, a sudden letting go: to 
Marlborough [the defendant gallery] he made the first big sales of his career, amounting 
to about $1,700,000." 
67. Counsel for executor Reis contended that his client's own considerable wealth, his 
advanced age (79 in 1974), and the small size of his $8,000 per annum salary from the 
gallery made it unlikely that the desire for personal aggrandizement induced him to 
compromise the interests of the estate in a transaction with the gallery. Surrogate Midon-
ick's response included the following: "This court finds that the prestige and status of Reis 
as a director, secretary and treasurer of [the gallery], apart from his salary ... , and his 
fringe benefits and perquisites, were quite important to Reis' life style." 84 Misc. 2d 842-
43, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 939. 
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Finally, while the court concluded that the 1970 sale and consign-
?Jlent was unfavorable in light of the gallery's highly profitable 
resales, much of the profit was generated by the gallery's vigorous 
promotion and by publicity from the litigation.88 
The costs of penalty awards in cases where a fiduciary's con-
duct is not obviously wrongful are most severe for estates consist-
ing of unique assets where potential conflicts of interest are com-
mon. Testators and settlors whose estates include real property, 
closely held corporate stock, stamps, books, automobiles, coins, 
or art understandably select as fiduciaries persons knowledgeable 
about those assets. As these persons accept fiduciary positions or 
deal with associates or potential associates who are fiduciaries, 
conflicts or potential conflicts of interest must arise. A rule which 
discourages the selection of persons who are experienced and suc-
cessful in the handling of the testator's kind of assets is clearly 
unwise. 
68. The surrogate noted: 
Before the contracts with the estate were executed, Marlborough [the gallery] 
undertook a comprehensive plan to promote Rothko paintings. The formulation of 
this plan was begun prior to the signing of the contracts in anticipation of the 
su,ccessful acquisition of estate paintings by Marlborough and the consignment of 
paintings for sale through Marlborough. This promotion consisted in the main of 
the arrangement of exhibitions of Rothko paintings throughout various countries 
and it must be recognized that such efforts enhanced the sales values of the paint-
ings and accomplished sales at prices in excess of those obtainable in the artist's 
lifetime. The experts who testified at the trial were not in agreement upon the 
question as to whether or not the death of an artist, and the consequent limitation 
of his available works, would result in higher valuations, but it cannot be gainsaid 
that the promotional efforts of Marlborough had a major effect in publicizing 
Rothko works and in creating a market for his product at higher prices, far higher 
than date of death values. 
84 Misc. 2d 860-61, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 955. 
The dissenting opinion of appellate division Judge Nunez added: 
Nor can it be gainsaid that Marlborough deserves much credit for creating a market 
for Rothko paintings during the artist's lifetime. And some of us are of the opinion 
that the extensive publicity given to this litigation which has become somewhat of 
a "cause celebre" also enhanced the value of Mr. Rothko's works. The price of 
$1,800,000 for 100 paintings does not compare unfavorably with the value of the 
decedent's paintings set by him in February, 1969 when he sold 87 of his paintings 
to Marlborough for $1,050,000 payable over 14 years under two contracts which gave 
Marlborough the exclusive right to sell Mr. Rothko's works of art for a period of 
eight years. I note that although no relief was sought by petitioner-respondent with 
respect to these contracts, the Surrogate found that "from their conduct" the par-
ties "intended to abandon and abrogate" them. Thus, the Surrogate sua sponte 
disposed of the 1969 inter vivas agreements which were a significant obstacle to the 
executors to sell the estate's paintings to any dealer other than Marlborough. Surely 
the exclusive covenant affected adversely the executors' bargaining power and the 
sale price of the property. 
56 App. Div. 2d at 508, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877. 
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Rothko will increase the complexity and cost of these trustee-
ships. As a precedent, it will encourage fiduciaries to consult their 
attorneys prior to any transaction possibly tainted with conflict 
of interest. And, if the attorneys read Surrogate Midonick's opin-
ion carefully, the fiduciaries will be advised to seek a court pro-
ceeding with notice for and an opportunity to be heard by all 
persons interested in the estate, including appropriate state offi-
cials if charitable bequests are involved. What could be more 
wasteful? Expedited transactions will become impossible; trans-
actions with the fiduciary's friends, associates, or any persons 
from whom some future favors might be predicted, no matter how 
favorable for the estate, will be too dangerous without test litiga-
tion and thus too expensive to be practical. For settlors and testa-
tors who would rather keep their estates out of court, the message 
of Rothko is obvious: they should either rearrange their estates so 
that they include only fungible and readily marketable assets or 
select fiduciaries without prior experience in handling the testa-
tor's unique assets. Conceivably, a settlor or testator might select 
an experienced fiduciary and expressly approve of the fiduciary's 
possible conflicts of interest. But this would be inviting trouble: 
broadly drawn exculpatory language may be held inapplicable, if 
not invalid, when tested against difficult facts. Finally, although 
a testator's draftsman might obviate the problem by providing 
that the fiduciary could sell to himself or to his associates at 
prices fixed by a committee of experts, a rule that penalizes all 
who fail to use the most innovative draftsmen surely can be ques-
tioned. It would be far better to permit the testator to select an 
honest and experienced fiduciary and to have rules which enable 
the fiduciary to operate in the estate's best interest without incur- -
ring grotesque legal risks. 
All of this is not to quarrel with the Rothko courts' findings 
of liability, but rather to point out that the award of appreciation 
damages to deter acts potentially injurious to the economic inter-
ests of trust beneficiaries is a cure worse than the problem. It 
tends to produce high legal costs, uneconomic selections of fidu-
ciaries, and exotic drafting.69 
69. Practically, it matters little to a trustee who is concerned about possible liability 
for conflicts of inter~st whether the high price of an adverse result is attributable to 
dubious rules for determining breach or to dubious penalty surcharges. Niles and 
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 169-70, observed: 
No trustee lives in a vacuum. If, as Judge Thacher suggests, a beneficiary may 
avoid any transaction in which a possible conflict might exist-however remote the 
conflict, however unlikely the self-interest-private and professional trustees have 
a difficult future in New York. May a beneficiary surcharge a trustee for any decline 
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Moreover, estate beneficiaries have adequate remedies 
against disloyal fiduciaries: the standard combination of restitu-
tion of unjustly realized benefits, causally related damages, and 
conventional sanctions against defaulting fiduciaries adequately 
deters unpermitted conduct. In Rothko, for example, the restitu-
tionary principle authorized an award of over $5,476,500 against 
the disloyal executors and the gallery. The court also removed all 
the executors from office, presumably without compensation for 
their efforts from early 1970 until the trial-court order in late 
1975, and charged them for the petitioners' attorney fees. Finally, 
the heavy burden of proof placed oµ a fiduciary who may have 
had personal reasons for his transactions in behalf of an estate 
also deters a fiduciary from engaging in questionable transac-
tions. 
Against the argument that Rothko may increase a fiduciary's 
legal costs, it might be argued that a fiduciary faced with possible 
conflicts of interest will incur these legijl costs whether or not 
Rothko penalties are assessed. That is, the standard remedies for 
disloyalty may induce fiduciaries, before every transaction1 to 
seek legal advice or court instructions concerning possible con-
flicts of interest. If that is true, the argument runs, the additional 
risk of liability for appreciation damages will not increase the 
legal costs of a fiduciary who may have a personal interest in 
conflict with that of the estate. 
This argument is unpersuasive. First, those honest and able 
fiduciaries in a position of possible conflict may well be willing 
to administer the estate without extraordinary legal advice or 
court instructions if they know that the estate's fair market value 
at the time of its disposition will provide a ceiling on their liabil-
ity. Honest fiduciaries will be overly cautious only when threat-
ened with surcharges they can neither estimate nor control. Sec-
ond, if costs will be the same without regard to the fiduciary's 
honesty, there is absolutely no justification for the award of any 
penalty surcharge in the name of deterrence. 
Even if these considerations are unpersuasive and fail to 
end the judicial thirst to penalize disloyal fiduciaries, a penalty 
in value if the trustee buys stock in a corporation of which he is an officer, a director, 
or even a stockholder? If a trustee is a lawyer, is he surchargeable for all loss if he 
buys shares or bonds of a corporation which he has advised or represented? Must a 
trust company avoid purchasing for its trust estates securities of corporations hav-
ing officers or directors who are also directors of the trust company? In any of these 
cases there could be a selfish interest to be served, and if any were shown there 
would be a breach of trust. But should the mere disclosure of the relationship, 
without more, permit an avoidance of the transaction in every case? 
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measured by the value at the time of trial of an asset that is 
beyond the defendant's control is a bizarre punishment. When 
a court assesses appreciation damages, it admits, contrary to 
the usual rule that the penalty fit the misdeed, that the size of 
the penalty need not be related to the degree of culpability. 
Yet, one violation of the duty of undivided loyalty is not necessar-
ily as unethical or immoral as another .. 70 There is a significant 
difference between stealing another's property, thereby leaving 
him nothing, and partially benefitting from a position of trust in 
a way that may have been contemplated and condoned by a gift-
maker. Rothko's executors, who were guilty of guessing wrong 
about the legality of self-aggrandizing acts that Rothko may have 
anticipated, were treated as thieves by the New York courts. 
Finally, as Rothko vividly illustrated, disguising apprecia-
tion damages as a form of compensation may lead to shattering 
liabilities that would never be levied in the name of pure punish-
ment. Few if any courts or juries in the land would have assessed 
a two-million dollar fine against executor Stamos. Stamos was a 
close friend of Rothko, a fellow artist and the guardian of 
Rothko's minor children. His disloyalty was simply that he 
wanted to favor the gallery because the gallery might help him 
gain recognition for his own works. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Trust law has progressed in the last several decades toward 
eliminating surcharges against breaching trustees for sums unre-
lated to restitution of benefits illegally received or to damages 
proximately caused by the breach. Rothko is a step backward: it 
seems more likely to increase expense and inefficiency in fidu-
ciary handlings of unique and speculative assets than to accom-
plish its avowed purpose of deterring disloyalty. 
Perhaps the decision will not be followed. In contrast to the 
outstanding quality of the trial judge's opinion concerning liabil-
ity, the portion of the opinion concerning damages is clearly 
strained. Perhaps the liability issue and the chore of tracing the 
paintings so preoccupied the court and counsel that they simply 
failed to pay adequate attention to the damage issue. The differ-
ence between personal liabilities of a small number of millions 
and several more millions may also have made the issue some-
70. Compare the case of a nonprofessional trustee who foolishly but innocently pur-
chases assets for a fair price from an estate he manages as fiduciary with deliberate and 
concealed embezzlement of the sort that occurred in McKim v. Hubbard, 142 Mass. 422, 
8 N.E. 152 (1886), supra note 54. 
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what insignificant to defendants who may well have been bank-
rupted by the smaller liability. What else could explain the stag-
gering liabilities erroneously charged to Levine, the loyal 
executor? 
That three of the five appellate division justices doubted or 
disagree-a with the surrogate's conclusions regarding damages fur-
ther weakens Rothko's strength as precedent. One of the three, 
Justice Kupferman, concluded that the importance of the case 
warranted the earliest possible review of the surrogate's findings 
on all issues by the court of appeals and so subdued his doubts 
and voted to affirm. Obviously, the size of the potential liabilities 
and the widespread publicity affected this stage of the proceed-
ing. The failure of the court of appeals to consider damages more 
carefully is disappointing, to say the least. Surely, that court's 
opinion on damages is the least satisfactory of all of the opinions 
filed in the case. 
My hope is that the startling high liabilities assessed in 
Rothko will induce other courts to reexamine the necessity and 
persuasiveness of the Rothko rulings on the size of the awards. In 
sum, the courts should reject Rothko and limit recoveries against 
disloyal fiduciaries to restitution and causally related damages. 
